Technology, Knowledge, and the Internet
Miller, Boaz & Isaac Record. 2013. Justified Belief in a Digital Age: On the Epistemic Implications of Secret Internet Technologies. Episteme 10(2): 101-118.
Miller, Boaz & Isaac Record. 2016. Responsible Epistemic Technologies: A Social-Epistemological Analysis of Autocompleted Web Search. New Media and Society, in press.
Record, Isaac & Boaz Miller. 2016, forthcoming. Taking iPhone Seriously: Epistemic Technologies and the Extended Mind. In Extended Knowledge, edited by Duncan Pritchard, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & J. Adam Carter. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Consensus and Dissent, Expertise, and Collective Knowledge
Miller, Boaz. 2009. What Does It Mean that PRIMES is in P? Popularization and Distortion Revisited. Social Studies of Science 39(2): 257-288.
Miller, Boaz. 2013. When Is Consensus Knowledge Based? Distinguishing Shared Knowledge from Mere Agreement. Synthese 190(7): 1293-1316.
Miller, Boaz. 2015. Why (Some) Knowledge is the Property of a Community and Possibly None of Its Members. The Philosophical Quarterly 65(260): 417-441.
Miller, Boaz. 2015. ‘Trust Me – I’m a Public Intellectual’: Margaret Atwood’s and David Suzuki’s Social Epistemologies of Climate Science. In Speaking Power to Truth: Digital Discourse and the Public Intellectual, edited by Michael Keren & Richard Hawkins, 113-128. Athabasca, AB: Athabasca University Press.
Miller, Boaz. 2016. Scientific Consensus and Expert Testimony in Courts: Lessons from the Bendectin Litigation. Foundations of Science 21 (1):15-33.
Evidence, Values, and Pragmatic Encroachment
Miller, Boaz. 2014. Science, Values, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4(2): 253-270.
Miller, Boaz. 2014. Catching the WAVE: The Weight-Adjusting Account of Values and Evidence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 47: 69-80.
Scientific Realism, Models and Idealization
Miller, Boaz. 2012. The Rationality Principle Idealized. Social Epistemology 26(1): 3-30.
Miller, Boaz. 2016. What is Hacking’s Argument for Entity Realism? Synthese, 193 (3):991-1006.